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THE NEED FOR ETHICS
BY OLAF STAPLEDON
IT IS A commonplace that ours is an age of disillusionment, and
that we follow on an age of complacency. In the days before
the war optimism was maintained only by setting the telescope to the
blind eye. For, apart from the social problem, which few even in
those days could entirely shun, three less urgent but more subtly
disturbing troubles were becoming widely noticed.
Pirst, even by the plain man it was beginning to be suspected that
the universe was indifferent to human desires. Man, it seemed,
must outgrow his trust in a celestial protagonist, and must depend on
himself alone both for his daily comfort and for the achievement of
his ideals.
Second, it was already rumored that man was doomed not only
to failure but also to insincerity. He was charged with being at
heart careless of everything but the satisfaction of crude animal in-
stincts. He valued his ideals, we were told, only so far as they
afforded "symbolical fulfillment" to his primitive cravings.
Third, and m)ost unsettling, if this vew of human nature were
true, all judgments of ethical good and evil were vitiated. For when
ever we judged anything to be objectively good, our value-judgment
was determined (it was said), not by the objective character and
relations of the thing itself as a whole, but by some superficial and
irrevelant feature which happened to stimulate instinctive or child-
hood cravings. Thus the considered judgments from which the
ethical distinction was derived appeared invalid as data for ethics.
And this view, that the distinction between good and bad was after
all meaningless, was also strongly suggested by the chaotic state of
ethical theory itself. For some writers defined "good" in one way,
and some in others. Some on the other hand, said it was indefinable ;
and some explained it in such a modern and "scientific" manner
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that they explained it away. Thus the very distinction on which any
ideal must be based, the distinction which religion and common sense
alike had assumed to be objective and universal, was beginning to
seem arbitrary. All causes, all ideals, all obligations and enthusiasms
were susoect in the suspicion that "goodness" itself was after all
meaningless.
Such were the three doubts, cosmological, psychological, and
ethical, that were creeping into the minds of thoughtful persons
even in that distant age which ended in 1914. Today they are more
prevalent.
Now the first of these questions is perhaps of no great im-
portance. During the rise of modern science there was much
anxiety among the intelligentsia as to whether the world was really
good, bad or indifferent ; or as to whether it was "on our side" or
not. When the more intelligent were as yet only beginning to wake
from the dreams of the more naive religious orthodoxy, this issue
was bound to seem urgent. Today we are perhaps no nearer an
answer than in the days when Huxley first opposed the ethical to the
cosmical ; but we are more ready to shelve the question and tackle
other matters. For it becomes clear that, if by "world" we mean
"the whole of being", the answer must wait until we know something
of the real nature of that whole. Moreover, the idtimate fate of our
race and our ideals seems now more remote and less important than
in the days before we realised the vastness of the future. But if by
"world" is meant the natural world, we are becoming reconciled to
the knowledge that Nature, our ever-fascinating mother, is more
resourceful than virtuous. We begin to cease from looking to her
either as a model or as a protagonist. True to the modern fashion in
filial piety, we are prone rather to correct than respect her. It is for
us. not for her to say what it is that is good, and to discover if pos-
sible whether or not goodness is but a delusion. As to her maternal
protection, we are alternately braced and grieved to find that we must
depend on ourselves alone. But we are no longer appalled.
The cosmological question thus deserves less attention than per-
haps it gets. For. granted that the good-bad distinction is valid,
Nature, as our intellectual and moral inferior, must simply be
brought to heel,—animal that she is. But as to the Whole,
whether it is "on our side" or not, how dare we pass judgment on
it? F"or, granted the validity of the ethical distinction, none but
a universally informed mind is entitled to judge the universe. It is
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possible that, though in our ethical distinction we truly grasp a uni-
versal principle, yet that zvhich in the cosmical view must be seen to be
good is far beyond the appreciative powers of our little minds. Much
that seemed to Queen Victoria very bad is judged by us to be very
good. Yet (though some of us easily forget it) the difference be-
tween the Queen's horizon and our own is perhaps less than the dif-
ference between ours and the span of all being. Who are we, that
we should judge the heavens by our childish values? Shall we, be-
cause the "gods" neither please us nor make themselves intelligible to
us, dub them insensitive or stupid? Parents, it is said, are justified
in fulfilling, not merely in pleasing their children. And the "gods",
if there be such, are to be justified not by the sweets they give us,
who indeed are very simple children, but by the judgment of the
fnllv enlightened mind, which may (conceivably) be theirs, but very
surely is not ours. For these reasons it is as well to leave the cosmo-
logical question untouched.
But the other two questions rightly become more insistent in the
plain man's mind every year. In the days when the teaching of
the churches was accepted at least intellectually by the congrega-
tions (and even by the great uncongregated) there was no ethical
problem in the plain man's mind. Spiritual advisers told him what
was good, and he accepted their verdict, in theory, if not in prac-
tice. Love was the good ; and the plain man accepted is as good,
not because he saw that it was so, but because the churches said that
God had said it was so.
Even before the war, however, very many had already ceased to
take their professed religion seriously, even on the side of theory.
The startling and bracing discoveries of science began to make us
incredulous of the old teaching, even if also far too credulous of the
new. But perhaps the main effect of science was that it made the old
hopes look trite and even childish. For the doctrine of science was
austere ; while the doctrine of the old faith was by now padded over
with comfortable devices. Comfort cannot stir us to loyalty. Thus,
while to some the orthodox view was merely unbelievable, to others,
though they had accepted it as true, it had ceased to be commanding.
Consequently, while in some quarters there was a purely intellectual
scepticism, in others there was a purely emotional disillusionment.
Elsewhere these two dissatisfactions were combined. And so the
ethical questions began to whisper themselves in many minds.
Those who felt most strongly the objective validity of the good-bad
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distinction, but had lost the old faith, craved most eagerly an ethical
theory not incompatible with their new cosmology. Those who
were still intuitively convinced that love was the best thing in the
world sought some justification other than the word of a God
whose existence they were beginning to doubt.
Then came the war. It gave us something large to do and vivid
to think. It pushed those doubts from the focus of our attention.
Already in the years before the war the only vivid ideal was national-
ism, and patriotism was tlie only compelling religion. The one thing
bigger than themselves which most men could both believe in and
care for was their "country" ; and they readily accepted the war as
the supreme religious rite of sacrifice to their romantic god.
It is true, of course, that the motives that led men to fight were
diverse. Not in all, perhaps not in many, was this strictly religious
impulse the main factor. ATany, no doubt, went simply to stamp out
a conflagration that seemed to threaten their homes and all whom
they loved. Some, on the other hand, went to escape the tyranny
of the economic mill ; some to escape mere boredom ; some to be
quit of their families or their friends ; some to assert their man-
hood in the eyes of women. The white feather flicked their self-
esteem, and drove them to accept without enthusiasm the sacrament
imposed by the only living orthodox faith, the faith in nationalism.
But these, who fought primarily for their own good name and not
for the romantic ideal, would never have been herded into khaki had
they not assumed that to shirk this ordeal was in fact shameful. Self-
pride alone will not force normal persons to swim Niagara or
swallow poison. They must feel that the deed is expected of them,
and rightly expected. They must expect it of themselves. In fact,
they must feel that to serve in the cause really is obligatory on all
self-respecting persons. They must admit the "ought", even though
they fulfill it only for self-pride. Of course, there were many who
went to the front for no reason whatever, but in response to herd-
suggestion,—with no more loyalty than sheep who follow their lead-
er. But how did that suggestion ever come into being? It arose
amongst those for whom "duty" was a meaningful word, who
iudged, however reluctantly, that there is sometJiinq other than the
person of each that has a "claim" on each because of its intrinsic
goodness.
Some of us. perhaps, are over cynical about Avar, or at least about
the motives of those who fought. For we incline to forget that, in
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an a.ge when the spur and the comfortable promises of reli.e^ious
faith were both of them less compelling than of old, when the ob-
jectivity of good was doubted and the hope of immortality fading,
men freely gave themselves for the only ideal which seemed to
claim them. As the religious faiths waned, the national faiths
waxed. Traditions of national dignity, righteousness and might
seemed less improbable than the doctrines of the churches, and far
more vivid. Moreover, patriotism was well within the capacity of
the schoolboy culture which alone was general, even among the edu-
cated. For the appeal of nationalism was two fold. It was easily
assimilated to our egoism ; yet it offered us something to serA-e, so'm,e-
thing other than, and greater than, our private selves. This was just
what we craved; on the one hand salvation for our self-esteem (so
crippled in the petty round of life), and on the other hand a clear
obligation, a dutv of service, however humble, in a great and vivid
cause. Had the war offered satisfaction to one only of these im-
pulses, its hold would have been less constant. But it fulfilled now
the one and now the other as our need varied ; and in no mood could
we escape it.
Had the peoples been able to take Christianity to heart, they
would not have needed the psychical "release" afforded by passionate
nationalism. Their egoism would have found fulfillment in the cer-
tainty of eternal salvation ; and their loyalty might have found in the
Christ-god an object both vivid and universal. But since this could
not be, the nation was taken as a substitute, and war was the great
rite. And the war, even if it has done nothing else of value, has.
I should say, underlined in red two facts of human nature. It has
shown, on the one hand, how subtly egoism can disguise itself even
from itself, accepting even agony and death for mere pride. But,
on the other hand, it lias shown that self-disregarding loyalty is a
quite normal capacity of man, and a capacity which can becornve
active even on a superb scale when a clear call comes. "Cant!" says
the sceptic. But is it cant? Looking back to those days, remember-
ing the details of the behaviour of our friends, and for that matter
our own heart-searchings, can we deny that each of us was deter-
mined to a greater or less extent by the cognition of values in rela-
tion to which our private needs were seen to be irrevelant.
But the nation is a sorrv substitute for the God of Love: and the
war disillusioned many. Nationalism, of course, is not yet seriously
in decline. Even today most of us but seldom and hesitatingly
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transcend it. Indeed on the fringes of our Western civilization it
spreads alarmingly ; and now it threatens to inflame even the East.
But, in the regions where it was born, patriotic zeal is perhaps tem-
pered slightly. We may hope that in time it may be reduced f ronn a
conflagration to a wholesome warmth in our hearts.
But the failure (or impending failure) of nationalism as a faith,
and of the nation as the supreme obiect of practical loyalty, forces
once more on the attention of thoughtful persons those ethical
problems which they had sought to ignore in a period of urgent
action. Those who are consciously troubled about these questions are
indeed few. Most folk consider ethical inquiry a priggish and futile
occupation. Yet these questions lurk in the background of all minds ;
and so they tend to get themselves answered inattentively, and to be-
come the secret source of prejudice and savage behaviour.
Consider the outstanding movements of the day. They seem to
be Facism, Bolshevism, and a recrudescence of the more supersti-
tious and preposterous "religious" sects. Fascism is accepted by
those who, still paying respect to the older religion of Europe, but
finding in nationalism the only commanding ideal, can only conceive
loyaltv in terms of fear and hate of rival nations .and parties. Fascism
assumes its ideal uncritically. Tt also uncritically assumes the valid-
ity of the fundamental ethical concept. Tt offers a faith, and exacts
devotion ; and therein lies its power. Bolshevism equally makes
ethical assumptions. Although it affects to despise ethics and meta-
physics, and to reduce obligation to egoism, yet it is evidently felt
as a faith, and as an ideal which has an absolute claim on the faithful.
Thus in the days of widespread disillusionment any ideal, however
crude, however rationally indefensible, is felt to be better than no
ideal at all.
Both these rnovements owe their strength in part to a dread of
doubt that increases as doubt becomes more insistent. Both satisfy
the craving for activity in a cause conceived as objectively important.
This phobia of uncertainty is perhaps also one source of the increase
of the cruder kinds of religious fanaticism. In this case, of course,
as in the others, one motive is the desire for mere personal salvation,
in this world or another : but it can scarcely be questioned that the
average fanatic, of whatever persuasion, does honestly feel that it is
supremely important, not for him, but for the world, that the flood
of doubt be dammed, and that his policy be followed as the only
means of world salvation. And thus it happens that an age of in-
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creasing scepticism is also an ag^e of increasing fanaticism. Very
many persons have desperately shut their eyes and swallowed whole
whatever comforting or commanding creed was available. They
have wilHngly exposed themselves to religious suggestion, or poli-
tical suggestion, till in time they have attained a real, but artificial,
state of faith. On the other hand an increasing number have
definitely freed themselves from every kind of theological allegiance
;
while on the political side also there are signs of a growing dis-
illusionment with established social ideals. Thus in both spheres, re-
ligious and political, it is lip-service that wanes ; faith and frank un-
faith alike increase.
It is not surprising that in an age of intellectual perplexity men
should take refuge either in irrational dogma or in a hand-to-mouth
pursuit of pleasure. And mere pleasure-seeking is evidently an in-
creasing fever today. The old-fashioned unreasoned restraints are
being removed ; and there is an unabashed claim to free life, free
thought, free love, in short for the free "creative" exercise of all
human faculties. And this is wholesome as a reaction from an age
of stuffy clothes and stufify morals. But is freedom an end or a
means? To the released captive it indeed seems for a while a
sufficient end. And to those who lack pleasures, pleasure seems
the end. Yet this pleasure grows stale; and an aimless freedom
becomes a prison. It is being well proved in these days that a life of
7nere impulse-satisfaction leads nowhere, and moreover is strangely
unsatisfying. In our present disillusionment the only freedom to be
sought is, it seems, a free fling before the crash. Surely it is this
conviction of the futility of all things that is at the root of our fever
to snatch joy before we die.
Some indeed have assumed a very different attitude in the gen-
eral disillusionment. They have devised a stoical ideal, which, by
emancipating man from all passing impulses, should enable him
to gain a kind of tragic triumph over the universe. They have said
:
"Man himself creates the distinction between good and evil. We will
take as our ideal (just because it pleases us to do so) freedom from
the tyranny of desire, and fearless contemplation of reality." Clear-
ly if pessimism is intellectually justified, this is the only sane attitude.
And even if the pessimistic view is mistaken, the stoic's is a whole-
some error. It was very necessary that we should learn not only
the irrationality of the older optimisms but also their banality. The
only way to an optimism of finer mood, if it be intellectually possible
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at all, is perhaps throug-h heartfelt acceptance of pessimism.
What, then, is the most significant feature of our age? Shall
we be remembered chiefly for our social conflicts, for our inter-
national confusion, for the brilliant adolescence of science, or for our
disillusionment? These are the features that we, who are immersed
in today, see most clearly. Yet there is a more memorable fact about
the modern world, a fact which we scarcely notice. Ours is the age,
not simply of disillusionnlent, but of the vindication of man's
capacity for loyalty even in the teeth of disillusionment. For what
has been happening since the days of secure faith? First, when the
ancient fear of hell was removed, men were discovered on the whole
not less but more responsible. And when later all the old beliefs
began to seem legendary and even petty, men did not plung-e into
individualism light-heartedly. Desperately they made of individual-
ism itself a kind of topsy-turvy ideal, and tried to be loyal to it ; or
at the verv least they found excuses for it, as being a means to some
universal end. Rut presently they began to tire of it, and to look
round for some more commanding object of loyalty. And so today,
along^side of the old religious objects, and the old uncriticised indi-
vidualisnT|, thrive the cults of nationalism, bolshevism, fascism,
—
movements which, though deeply infused by man's self-regard,
would none of them be what they are, were they not also irradiated
by his unquenchable capacity for loyalty. But of these faiths bol-
shevism is the most glorious example of devotion in disillusionment.
Sown in contempt of human nature, it has flowered into a self-for-
getful enthusiasm by which, in spite of its intellectual wrong head-
edness, human nature is vindicated.
Xone of these faiths can withstand dispassionate criticism. Each
in turn must sooner or later seem incoherent and petty. And so, in
conflicting waves of disillusionment and devotion to new objects, and
again disillusionment, we live out our stormy age. Never before,
perhaps, have the objects of loyalty been subjected to such keen
criticism. Never before has loyalty been driven so desperately from
object to object in search of that which, of its own nature, can
command allegiance. Even when, in the last extremity, men try to
live without any devotion whatever, they prove their essentially
loyal nature by a sense of futility and guilt that they cannot explain
away. On the other hand the stoic, disillusioned with all other ob-
jects, is driven to conceive in his own mind an ideal of conduct. anJ
to achieve a precarious peace by pretending with all his might that
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this, which he beHeves to be a fig^ment of his personal taste, is yet
somehow of intrinsic and universal excellence.
Thus on all hands man's loyalty is vindicated. But to see that
loyalty is a real factor in human nature is not to answer those an-
cient ethical questions which all thoughtful persons needs must face
today. Indeed, the mere prevalence of devotion to causes does not
itself prove even that loyalty ever is, as it purports to be, called into
being by the intrinsic value of its object, and not merely by some
secret and primitive itch of the experient himself. Still less is it
clear that the ethical distinction between good and bad, on which
loyalty claims to rest, is an intelligible distinction. What do we
really 111 ean when we speak of things as good and bad absolutely or
universally? What, if anything, can we mean intelligibly by such
phrases? Has "good" ultimately no meaning at all but "good for"
some conscious being or other? Or is our delight in the goodness
of a thing, not prior to its goodness, but consequent on it? And in
what sense "ought" a man to act so as to bring goods into being and
abolish bads? What does it mean to say that he ought to do so
whether he wants to or not, and even that the act itself ought to be
done whether anyone admits the obligation or not?
And further if the ethical distinction is not simply a delusion,
what kinds of things is it that in this actual world are good, and what
bad? And what is it that would be the ideal, the best of all? What
is the end for which we all ought to be striving? These latter indeed
are the really interesting questions ; but clearly the others are more
fundamental. And perhaps the true answer to these fundamental
ethical questions might turn out to be after all simply that they are
meaningless.
Such briefly are the well worn theoretical problems which, I sug-
gest, have today become practical problems. Just because no ethical
theory is now taken for granted, a sound ethical science is needed,
whether its findings be positive or negative. Ethics has not hitherto
been a live issue ; and so the works of ethicists have mostly been ab-
stract and remote. Only lately has ethical scepticism been not merely
propounded but deliberately put into practice. Only lately has it be-
gun to break down well-established habits of behaviour. For today,
while much human conduct is still based on the old assumption of
the universality of good and bad, much also springs definitely from
the conviction that this distinction is invalid. Now that theoretical
differences are carried into practice, our practice becomes more
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radically and bitterly discordant than ever before. May our theory
in turn be revivified by its new practical import
!
Not all of us, indeed, are aware of the ethical problems explicitly
,
but all our lives are influenced by the fact that there is no agreement
about them. And probably every intelligent person is at some time
or other painfullv conscious of them. Thev have, of coiu^se, been
faced many times in the past, and many times answered in terms
of successive cultures. Yet they remain for most of us still un-
soh-ed. and we crv out for a solution of them in our modern speech.
For just as physical science is finding itself no longer able to avoid
philosophical questions, so politics, social reform, and even the pri-
vate life of each man and woman, are being influenced by doubts
whose nature is philosophical. In fact, there lurks in the background
of every mind today a profound ethical perplexity.
Of all these problems, one which is not strictly ethical, demands
consideration before the others. Since ethical theories must be
founded in our everv'-day ethical experience, they must seek a true
psychological account as to the nature of that experience. It is sug-
gested by some psychologists that though to himself a man seems
to judge things good and bad intrinsically, and to render allegiance
to his ideals without reference to his private needs, really he docs
nothing so simple. His ideal, whatever its form, appeals to him,
not because he sees that the world needs it, but because it "symboli-
cally satisfies" primitive or instinctive needs of his own which con-
sciously he would probably dismiss as irrelevant, puerile, and per-
haps even base. Thus our most admired "good" is displayed as but
a pale approximation to the sweets of our childhood, or to the simple
pleasures of the instinctive animal. AVho defends the oppressed does
so, not because it really is "good" that these oppressed should be
freed, but because, meddling thus, he satisfies his secret itch for the
"feel" of revolt.
If this account is the whole truth about our ethical experience,
further ethical inquiry is a waste of time. For ethics derives from
our value-judgments about things. And if. when we judge a thing
good, our judgment is determined not by that aspect of it which we
consciously declare to be good, but by some unnoticed and super-
ficial similarity between the present situation and some situation
forgotten and irrelevant, clearly our value-judgment is no ground
for a science of ethics. For every value-judgment that claims to be
dispassionate, and rationally determined in relation to the objective
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world, is condemned as mere "rationalization" cloaking some in-
stinctive prejudice.
Instinct psychology, however, in claiming to be a complete ac-
count of human behaviour, falls into the same extravagance as the
rationalist psychology which preceded it. For it claims that all be-
haviour is of one type. Now possibly very much of our behaviour
and our valuing is as the instinct psychologists declare ; though we
might be more readily persuaded by them if they could agree amongst
themselves as to what an instinct is, and what instincts are. Waiv-
ing this protest, however, we may grant that many value-judgments
are formed "automatically", not in relation to all the tendencies of
the field of experience, but in relation only to an instinctive or
primitive core of organic or personal tendencies. It is, indeed, very
evident that every man often values and behaves, not in relation to
the greatest need which he himself cognizes in the real world, but
only in relation to needs cognized in a certain part of the real world,
namely in his own organism or in that system of objective needs
which constitutes his private self.
But we have attended lately too much to the abnormal and to the
primitive vestiges in man, forgetting his distinctively human attri-
butes. We are not justified in regarding intelligence as solely a pur-
veyor to instincts. Even the purest instinctive conation involves an
environment, organic and extra organic, and involves cognition of
some tendency objective to the conative act itself. At every stage,
then, tendencies which are conated are tendencies cognized in an
objective environment, private or public. At every stage conation
presupposes cognition of an objective tendency. We have no reason,
then, to declare that one mode of cognition, and in fact the most de-
veloped mode, is alone unable to determine conations. The ofBce of
intelligence is, not merely to find means for the satisfaction of the
more familiar tendencies (apprehended by a more primitive cog-
nition"), but to penetrate further into the environment and discover
new tendencies which, in their own right shall be accepted as grounds
of conation.
Thus it is that the goals of instinct are progressively criticised
and subordinated to wider ends, which in no significant sense are
simply "derived" from the ends of instinct. But, of course, it may
well be, as was admitted above, that established automatic modes of
behavior often resist control by newly cognized tendencies. Simi-
larly, it may well be that many value-judgments are mere "auto-
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matisms", in that they are valuingfs of things merely for unessential
characters that happen to afford instinct satisfaction. But to
suppose that all value-judgment is necessarily determined only by
cognition of innate organic tendencies, or by innate "psycho-physi-
cal dispositions", is to misunderstand the essential nature of conation,
and to misrepresent human behaviour for the sake of a theory.
Of the three grave doubts which were noted at the opening of
this discussion we have dismissed the cosmological problem as ir
relevant, and the psychological attack on ethics has now appeared in-
valid. We are left with the strictly ethical questions as to the
status of goodness and obligation, and the concrete nature of the
ideal. All that has been done is to show on the one hand that these
questions are urgent and on the other that they do not appear mean-
ingless when we look closely into the psychological nature of the
experience which gives rise to them. It is clearly impossible to dis-
cuss these problems here. But there is a task preliminary to such a
discussion, and it may now fittingly be undertaken. Ethicists have
often strayed, I think, through making false assumptions as to the
character of the fundamental ethical experience. They have dis-
torted their data to fit their theories. The only hope of advance
seems to lie in a more careful introspection of the ethical situation
as it appears to the ordinary man when he is not sophisticated by any
doctrine. I venture, therefore, to summarize my own experience as
follows, and to suggest that it is typical.
To be faced with a moral choice, I find, is to be forced to choose
between fulfilling one tendency cognized as in the world and fulfill-
ing another tendency cognized as in the world. For instance, it may
be that on the one hand my person, which is one factor in the
world, cannot freely act and develop without a certain thing,
and that on the other hand my having that thing would prevent the
free activity of another person, or of society, or the world as a
whole. In such a situation, T find that I call that course the better
which would (I believe) result in the objectively most complete ful-
filment of the world as a whole, whether the seat of that fulfilment
be within my private person or elsewhere. What I mean by "good"
thus turns out to be simply the fulfilling of objective tendencies. And
by "the ideal" I find that T nican the most complete fulfilment of the
capacities of the universe.
I certainly do not mean by "good" the pleasant feeling that I
have when I am aware of the fulfilment of some tendency of my
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person or of the world at large. I mean the fulfilment itself. Nor
do I suppose for a moment that the ideal is simply that all folk
should be pleased always. Everything depends on what it is that
pleases them. If they are pleased with the fulfilment of petty ten-
dencies only, the ideal is not realized. A universal tipsy beatitude
would not be ideal.
Nor do I mean by "good" simply the fulfilment of my own
personality, unless by "my personality" be meant the real of which
my mental content is but a fragmentary and distorted appearance.
But to call this "my personality", and its tendency toward fulfil-
ment "my real will" is confusing. Of course, 1 can only judge that
to be the ideal which would constitute the greatest fulfilment of my
mental content ; but I call it so, not because it is my fulfilment, but
because it purports to be tlie zuorld's fulfilment.
Faced with a moral choice, I may see quite clearly which course
would lead to the better result, and yet I may choose the other. I
may, that is, cognize tendencies that are more important objectively
than those which alone determine my conation. On such occasions
there may be a painful discord in me. But I do not suppose that
the wrongness of my choice consists in my having produced this dis-
cord in myself, or in mv having violated my own "real will" for self-
fulfilment. The wrongness of my choice is experienced as consisting
in the fact that certain objectively minor tendencies of the world
have fulfilled themselves through my will at the expense of certain
objectively major tendencies.
The moral experience, then, is less truly expressed by the propo-
sition, "I feel that I ought to do so and so", than by the propositions,
"I judge that so and so ought to be done; and further that it ought
to be done by me". The "ought" is experienced as deriving not
from my nature as a "moral agent", but from the world's nature as
pressing toward fulfilment. Or, lest this phrase should seem to imply
some theory as to the nature of the world as a whole, perhaps it
were better to say simply that the "ought" is experienced as deriving
from the nature of whatever objects are cognized as pressing toward
fulfilment.
In some such terms as these the moral experience must be de-
scribed. And whatever difficulties are thus raised, the essential
features of this description must be respected by any theory that
claims to solve those difficulties. For instance, we must of course
ask how the tendency of the world, or of objects in the world can
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have any "claim"on me unless it is in some sense my tendency, unless
in some sense / really will it. And we must answer in the first place
that indeed the tendency of the world has no "claim" on me unless /
co.g^nize it as "demanded" by the world. But whether it is a claim
"on me" or not. it is a claim ; that is to say it is a tendency of the
world. And when it is felt as a claim on me, it is so felt sinvply
because it is cognized as a tendency of the world. There is really no
more mystery in my being moved to conate a tendency of the "ex-
ternal" world than in my being moved to conate any "private" ten-
dency, say the tendency of my body to rest when its tissues are ex-
hausted. In conating at all I accept a tendency congnized in some
part of the world. Were there no such cognition I should have
nothing to conate. It is the objective tendency itself which arouses
me to conate at all. and sets the direction of my conation. Thus the
true mvsterv is. not that I should ever conate the greatest fulfilment
of mv cognized world, but that T should ever conate anything less.
.Knvbow, whatever be tbe true solution of the difficulties raised by
moral experience, no solution can be true which mis-states the data
found in the plain man's daily life.
These problems as to the abstract form of goodness and the
logical ground of obligation constitute only the first and least inter-
esting task for the ethicist. Having arrived at some solution of
them we should be entitled to pass on to discover, so far as in our
present naive ignorance we may, the concrete nature of the objective
ideal. Taking into account all that we know of our world, and all
that we have good reason to surmise, we must try to fashion, as
precisely as may be, an image of our goal. Such an image, vivid,
believable, all comprehensive, is very urgently needed today. When
idols were accepted there was no will to seek the gods. But when
the idols rot, and despairingly we find no good in anything, then at
least there is hope that we may glimpse tnie values.
